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POLITICS OVERRIDES LEGAL PRINCIPLES:




Many commentators have suggested that the international community
could have played a more positive role regarding the crisis in Bosnia-
Herzegovina if it had enforced well-established legal principles and
decisions made by the United Nations Security Council.' This commen-
tary on the importance of law should have been considered from the
beginning of the crisis when the international community made critical
decisions concerning the recognition of independence. These decisions
had grave consequences for the protection of civilian populations. Unfor-
tunately, the real problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina were ignored despite
the relevance of the legal opinion written by the Arbitration Commis-
sion2 composed of the European Community's finest jurists. Legal prin-
ciples were pushed aside in favor of political interests, resulting in inter-
national policy that does not reconcile with international law.
* Atle Grahl-Madsen Fellow in Law, Centre for Refugee Studies, York Univer-
sity. B.A. (McGill University, 1989), LL.B. (Universitd de Montrdal, 1992). LLM.
(Osgoode Hall Law School, 1995). The author is grateful to the Centre for Refugee
Studies for its support. Special thanks are due to family members and friends.
1. See Amiral Antoine Sanguinetti, L'oubli choquant du droit international:
Faux-fuyants europiens en Bosnie, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Jan. 1995, at 3 (noting
that the international community was unwilling to militarily enforce Security Council
resolutions).
2. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission Opinion No. 4, 31 1.L.M.
1501 (1992).
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I. CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
A. THREE CONSTITUENT NATIONS
Three constituent nations existed in the former Yugoslav Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovina: Croats, Serbs and Muslims. According to 1981
census figures, the population of the Republic was composed as follows:
18.3% Croat, 32% Serb, 39.5% Muslim. 3 The remainder of the popula-
tion included various minorities and people who identified themselves as
"Yugoslavs".4 The term from which the translation "nation" is obtained,
narod, is used in the 1974 Constitution in a way that most resembles
the German Volk in that it refers to a people defined by common cultur-
al and historical ties. One should not confuse it with citizenship.
There has been confusion, nevertheless, in the way the international
news media has used the terms "Muslim" and "Bosnian." Muslims were
recognized de facto as a distinct nation in the 1971 census and de jure
in the 1974 Constitution.' With their own recent and growing nationalist
3. PAUL GARDE, VIE ET MORT DE LA YOUGOSLAVIE 116 (1992).
4. Id. The figures for the uncompleted 1991 census were established in the con-
text of ethnic-nationalist tensions and state dissolution: 17.3% Croats, 31.4% Serbs,
43.7% Muslims and 5.5% Yugoslavs. For statistics on the region's population during
the last two centuries, see, e.g., GEORGES CASTELLAN, HISTOIRE DES BALKANS 316
(1991) (citing statistics for religious population in former Yugoslavia in 1807-1808);
Ivo BANAC, THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA 361 (1984) (citing statistics
for religious population in former Yugoslavia in 1910); Xavier Bougarel, Bosnie-
Herzdgovine: anatomie d'une poudrire, HtRODOTE, no. 67, 1992, at 89 (organizing
statistics reflecting the religious and ethnic populations in the former Yugoslavia be-
tween 1879 and 1991). In general, it appears the Serb population has slowly de-
creased over the last two centuries, while the Muslim population has slowly been
increasing in number. See also LENARD J. COHEN, BROKEN BONDS: YUGOSLAVIA'S
DISIN EGRATION AND BALKAN POLITICS IN TRANSITION 139 (1995) (noting figures on
the composition of the region's population in 1991).
5. See generally CONSTITUTION OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA.
6. Id. The Communist Party actually began recognizing a distinct Muslim nation
in the late 1960s: "An official of the Central Committee of the Bosnian Communist
Party officially proclaimed in 1968 that 'Muslims, as our socialist praxis demonstrates,
are a distinct nation."' LE MONDE, March 29, 1969, at II, cited in ALEXANDRE
PoPovic, LES MUSULMANS YOUGOSLAVES 25 (1990) [hereinafter POPOvic]. See MISHA
GLENNY, THE FALL OF YUGOSLAVIA 141 (1993):
In the 1960s, young Moslem graduates and professionals were able to articulate
the needs and requirements of their community as a distinct entity within Yugo-
slavia for the first time The student unrest which swept Europe in 1960 found
a powerful resonance in Sarajevo, where for the first time young Moslems were
able to force concessions from the Party which grudgingly admitted that their
1996] CONSEQUENCES OF INTERVENTION 769
sentiment,' Muslims resented being referred to as "Serbs" or "Croats"
who had simply converted to Islam under the Ottoman rule in order to
enjoy privileges over the Christian populations The problem was that
they lacked a national name The attempt to introduce the term "Yugo-
slav" did not accommodate their desire to have their own distinct culture
recognized. Although they have become largely secular, the explicit
religious origins of their identity have made it difficult to define their
nationhood.'" The term "Bosnian" could not be used since it suggested
that they were somehow more indigenous than the majority of the in-
habitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina who belong to the Serb and Croat
nations and who have been present on the territory for as long as the
people fulfilled the requirements of a Yugoslav nation.
7. The following historical account provides insight on the recent nature of this
nationalist sentiment among Muslims:
[D]espite its total mastery of the Bosnian Muslim community [following the
First World War], the JMO [Yugoslav Muslim Organization] could not present
itself as the representative of a formed national group, the notion of a separate
Bosnian Muslim nationhood being unacceptable not only to the Serbs and
Croats but to the Muslim leaders themselves.
BANAC, supra note 4, at 371.
8. See DANIEL VERNEr & JEAN-MARC GONIN, LE RtVE SACRIFa9: CHRONIQUES
DES GuERREs YOUGOSL.AVEs 98 (1994) ("[T]he Ottoman Empire granted privileges to
those who embraced the Prophet's religion: fiscal advantages, positions in the admin-
istration, and even titles of nobility. This allowed Bosnian Muslims to comprise the
the Bosnian elite right through today.").
9. See Jesmo 1i Srbi ii Hrvati? [Are We Serbs or Croats?], PRAVDA. Dec. 30,
1920, at 1, cited in BANAC, supra note 4, at 374 n.33 (observing the Bosnian failure
to produce a "new hybrid nationality").
10. See Mark Pinson, The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina Under Austro-Hungari-
an Rule, 1878-1918, in THE MusL is OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 89 (Mark Pinson ed.,
1993) (discussing the "substitution among Bosnian Muslims of religion for national
identity').
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Muslims themselves." Eventually, the term "Muslim" (with a capital
"M" in the local language) was officially adopted."
As peculiar as this may seem to readers who are accustomed to the
notion that the term "Muslim" refers to a follower of the Islamic faith,
one should understand that this is how the 1974 Constitution attempted
to deal with the profound desire on the part of some inhabitants of
Bosnia-Herzegovina to have their nationhood recognized and distin-
guished from the other two nations sharing the same territory. The con-
stitutional terms designating nationhood have to be retained in order to
grasp correctly the nationalist dimension of the conflict in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and in order to avoid the confusion and imprecision result-
ing from the use of the term "Bosnian" by many commentators.'3
11. The Austro-Hungarian Empire failed in trying to create a specific "Bosnian"
nationhood (encompassing Muslims, Serbs and Croats) when they controlled the region
following the Treaty of Berlin (1878) until the First World War. Id. at 88. Ever since
the Ottoman Empire left the region in 1878, the growing nationalism among Serbs
and Croats has placed the issue of nationhood at the forefront of political tensions in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. A multinational "Bosnian" identity has never officially emerged,
despite the region's distinctive character.
The Austro-Hungarian Civilian Administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina has de-
cided to promote a specific Bosnian national conscience; it thought it could
rally the Muslims from whom faith in the Koran had encaptured all memory of
the historical background. This attempt turned out to be artificial and in vain.
The more the conflicts of nationality multiplied in the Habsburg Empire and in
the Balkans, the more Bosnia-Herzegovina strengthened the double equation,
Catholic equals Croat, Orthodox equals Serb, while the Muslims formed a sep-
arate core for which national identity remained problematic.
CASTELLAN, supra note 4, at 350. See BANAC, supra note 4, at 360 (noting at-
tempts to foster a separate Bosnian nationhood); Pinson, supra note 10, at 103
(discussing Austrian attempts to introduce an official Bosnian identity).
12. When referring to followers of the Islamic faith, local languages use a small
"Im". GLENNY, supra note 6, at 141. Theoretically, people in Bosnia-Herzegovina
could therefore declare themselves as Muslim atheists, Muslim catholics, etc.
13. Muslims have often been designated as "Bosnians" who are defending
"Bosnia" against Serb or Croat attacks. This, in turn, has led to the erroneous sugges-
tion that the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina is purely an example of foreign aggres-
sion. One year after the outbreak of hostilities, the United States Secretary of State
was playing an active role at international negotiations on the crisis, unaware that the
Serbs were as "Bosnian" as the Muslims:
David Owen is astonished by a reproach from Warren Christopher:.
"The Serbian invasion is the fault of the Europeans. You should have
prevented the Serbs from entering Bosnia."
He understands that the Secretary of State does not know that 1,300,000




Even though it is arguably the main cause of the present armed con-
flict, there has been almost no discussion of the constitutional crisis in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. The first free elections in the former Yugoslav
Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina's short history" occurred in 1990 and
resulted in the nationalist parties of the three constituent nations taking
86% of the vote in proportions generally reflecting their percentages of
the population. 5 Though the nationalist parties agreed that the multina-
tional Communists should be removed from power, the deep divisions
created by the organization of parties along national lines should not be
underestimated. 6
The three nationalist parties agreed to share various functions at the
Republican level and agreed to continue with the principle of consensus
when working on important constitutional matters."' This was in accor-
dance with the 1974 Constitution which provided for the equality of the
three constituent nations." A limited veto power for each nation was
crucial since a combination of any two nations automatically produced a
"Take a look at the map," the Euorpean mediator tells him, "the Serbs
live here."
VERNET & GONIN, supra note 8, at 163.
14. Tito's Communists created the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-
Herzegovina when they decided at the end of the Second World War to join two
distinct geographic regions in order to form one of the constituent Republics of the
new Communist Yugoslavia.
15. See GARDE, supra note 3, at 292 (showing that the makeup of the body
included: SDA (Muslim): 86 parliamentary seats; SDS (Serb): 72; HDZ (Croat): 44;
Communists (multinational): 20; Markovic's Reformist Party (multinational): 13).
16. GLENNY, supra note 6. at 147.
Driving across Bosnia in 1990 just prior to the elections afforded me a brief
glimpse into the republic's miserable future. One village drowning in a sea of
green crescents, which proclaimed the (Moslem) Party of Democratic Action
(SDA), would give way to another, where the fahovnica (denoting the Croatian
Democratic Union) was sovereign, or where every wall was covered with the
four Cs and the acronym SDS (the Serbian Democratic Party). In some villages,
the western half was green while the eastern half was red, white and blue
(Serbian) while in many towns it was easy to identify the predominantly Croat,
Serb or Moslem districts. Many doomed settlements were a jumble of all three.
Id.
17. The leader of the Muslim nationalist party, Alija Izetbegovic, became the
President of the Republic's Presidency, while Momcilo Krajisnik (Serb) became the
parliamentary President and Jure Pelivan (Croat) became the Prime Minister. GARDE,
supra note 3, at 292-93.
18. CONSTITUTION OF BosNIA-HERZOGOVINA, arts. 1, 2, 3.
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majority in the event of a vote. Only strict adherence to the consensus
principle could guarantee that the rights of the three nations would not
be threatened. At the local level, however, the party that represented the
majority group in each particular opgtina (sub-Republican administrative
unit) seized absolute control.19
Following the 1990 elections, the parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina
did not adopt a single law. The tensions in the parliament finally ex-
ploded when the Muslim and Croat parties agreed in October 1991 to
adopt a "platform" on the future sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina that
was to be confirmed by referendum." According to this document,
Bosnia-Herzegovina would remain in a new Yugoslav community only
if it included both Croatia and Serbia. Since this was an unlikely devel-
opment given the fighting between Croats and Serbs in Croatia follow-
ing its declaration of independence from Yugoslavia, the Serbs inter-
preted this gesture as the beginning of Bosnia-Herzegovina's formal
separation from the Yugoslav federation, in which they felt secure. The
Serbs consequently left the parliament and created their own assembly
near the capital city, Sarajevo (Pale).2' During autumn 1991, so-called
Serb autonomous provinces appeared throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina."
The creation of several Croat autonomous regions immediately fol-
lowed.'
By the end of 1991, the parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina found
itself in an impasse since it had to enact a new constitution in order for
the Republic to become independent. To do this legally, the three nation
consensus principle dictated that the parliament needed the participation
of the Serb parliament members. Although no longer formally partic-
ipating in the parliament's activities, the Serbs made it clear through
unofficial channels that they had no intention of cooperating unless a
19. See GLENNY, supra note 6, at 153 ("[Ihe local [Bihac] SDA leadership had
begun a purge of Serb officials who controlled many state enterprises. This was the
normal practice throughout BiH. The dominant party in the region would undertake a
purge of the administration although it was never as severe as the HDZ purge of
Serbs in Croatia."). See also Robert M. Hayden, Constitutional Nationalism in the
Formerly Yugoslav Republics, 51 SLAViC REv. 654, 661 (1992) (noting "the victorious
part of the majority ethnic group took absolute control over local government, purging
all not of their nation").
20. MIHAILO CRNOBRNJA, LE DRAME YOUGOSLAVE 176-77 (1994).
21. See GLENNY, supra note 6, at 165 (noting that Serbian MPs had walked out
of the parliament and formed their own nearby).
22. Bougarel, supra note 4, at 144.
23. Id.
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political solution could be achieved that would sufficiently protect their
rights. In the event that such a solution was not possible, the Serbs
made no secret of their preparations for an armed conflict.24 Equally
worrisome was the huge presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina of the Yugo-
slav People's Army (JNA) which was legally stationed in the Republic
since it was still part of the Yugoslav federation.' At that stage, how-
ever, the JNA was clearly supporting the Serb nationalist cause and had
no intention of allowing territory where its military material and installa-
tions were concentrated to leave Yugoslavia.'
II. INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION
A. PuRsurr OF INDEPENDENCE
Despite the fact that the parliament no longer contained the elected
representatives of one of the constituent nations, President Izetbegovic
decided to seek international recognition for the independence of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The European Community (EC) created an Arbitration
Commission that consisted of the presidents of five EC constitutional
courts in order to deal with legal problems regarding the former Yugo-
slaviaY The Commission received notification on December 20, 1991
so that it could examine the request.' The fact that the EC was even
considering the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina's independence under
these circumstances worried key actors in the international community's
preventive diplomatic efforts."
24. GLENNY, supra note 6, at 151.
In August [1991] .... the [Yugoslav] federal Prime Minister ... leaked a
tape conversation between President Milosevic [of Serbia] and General Nikola
Uzelac, who ran the Banja Luka corps of the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] .
... During this conversation, Milosevic ordered Uzelac to release weapons to
the leader of the SDS [Serb nationalist party in Bosnia-Herzegovina], Radovan
Karadzic.
Id.
25. See id. (noting President Izetbegovic's concern over the presence of the JNA
in Bosnia).
26. Jean-Arnault Derens, La Bosnie-Herzdgovine, in LA FRAMhENTATION DE LA
YOUGOSLAVIE 42 (Catherine Samary ed., 1992); GLENNY, supra note 6, at 151-152.
27. Alain Pellet, Note sur la commission d'arbitrage de la confirence europienne
pour la paix en yougoslavie, 37 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 329,
332 (1991).
28. Marc Weller, The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. AND POL'Y 569, 587 (1992).
29. As a senior European diplomat who served as the assistant to Lord
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It is important to understand the EC's position in order to grasp the
relationship between preventive diplomacy and state self-interest regard-
ing the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. The German Government, under
pressure from German public opinion which was sympathetic to Croatian
and Slovenian independence, presented an ultimatum to EC Member
States at a meeting on December 16, 1991: if the EC did not recognize
the independence of Croatia and Slovenia, Germany would proceed by
itself in recognizing these two states even though this was contrary to
the common European foreign policy provision agreed to in the
Maastricht Treaty that had just been signed several days earlier." EC
Member States reached a "compromise" solution whereby any Republic
from the former Yugoslavia could apply for recognition of indepen-
dence. The formal recognition of independence was to take place on
January 15, 1992. The one month delay would allow the Arbitration
Commission to advise the EC whether the applicants satisfied an exten-
sive list of basic criteria relating to the rule of law, democracy and
human rights."
While the Arbitration Commission's opinions were not legally bind-
ing, what fundamentally undermined its role was that, in the end, the
German government decided not to wait for the issuance of advisory
opinions but proceeded to recognize Croatia and Slovenia on December
23, 1991.32 Furthermore, even though the Arbitration Commission stat-
ed on January 11, 1992 that Croatia did not completely fulfill all the
Carrington (Chairperson of the EC's Peace Conference on Yugoslavia) has stated:
"The decision to ask Bosnia-Herzegovina if it wanted independence, was, according to
Carrington, 'a tragic error."' HENRY WYNAENDTS, L'ENGRENAGE - CHRONIQUES
YOUGOSLAVES 154 (1993). See Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 721, UN Doec. 23280-21 (Dec. 1991) (relaying fear that "early,
selective recognition could widen the present conflict and fuel an explosive situa-
tion .... ").
30. VERNET & GoNmN, supra note 8, at 78-85; WYNAENDTS, supra note 29 at
151.
31. European Community: Declaration on Yugoslavia and on the Guidelines on
the Recogniztion of New States (December 16, 1991), in 31 1.L.M. 1485, 1486 (1992).
The Community and its member States agree to recognize the independence of
all the Yugoslav Republics fulfilling all the conditions set out below. The im-
plementation of this decision will take place on January 15, 1992 . . . The
applications of those Republics which reply positively will be submitted through
the Chair of the Conference to the Arbitration Commission for advice before
the implementation date.
Id.
32. VERNEr & GoNIN, supra note 8, at 86; GLENNY, supra note 6, at 163-164.
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criteria,33 the other EC Member States proceeded to recognize both
Croatia and Slovenia on January 15, 1992, as planned.' In order to
accommodate Germany's new political demands "5 and pressure from
public opinion, the Member States openly discarded the EC's top ju-
rists.3" Unfortunately, this set the tone for the EC's handling of the par-
ticularly explosive situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in spite of the many
warnings against premature recognition.
On January 11, 1992, the Arbitration Commission examined President
Izetbegovic's request and issued an advisory opinion on Bosnia-
Herzegovina's independence.37 The Arbitration Commission rejected the
request, noting "that the Serbian members of the Presidency did not
associate themselves" with the various independence declarations and
undertakings.38 Referring to the wishes of the Serbs to remain in a Yu-
goslav federation as established by a plebiscite and a Serb Assembly
resolution, the Arbitration Commission declared "that the will of the
peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina to constitute the Socialist Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovina (SRBH) as a sovereign and independent State can-
not be held to have been fully established." '39 It concluded that its posi-
tion was reviewable if "appropriate guarantees were provided by the
Republic applying for recognition, possibly by means of a referendum of
33. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission, Opinion No 5. in 31
I.L.M. 1503, 1505 (1992). Notably, the human rights legislation did not accord suffi-
cient autonomy to the Serb inhabitants who were supposed to be protected by provi-
sions relating to an agreed "special status."
34. VERNE" & GONIN, supra note 8, at 86.
35. Id. at 22. See GLENNY, supra note 6, at 191-192 (relating the difficulty that
the United Kingdom had in accepting Germany's decision).
According to one senior Foreign Office (FO) official, the British government
had still not decided two days before the official recognition date, 15 January,
whether to accept the German position or not. There were two lines of thinking
inside the FO. The first, centered on the Embassy in Belgrade, argued flatly
against recognition. The second, known as the Brussels lobby, maintained that
because Germany had afforded Britain so many concessions at Maastricht then
it would be churlish to oppose Germany's main foreign policy concern of the
early 1990s, particularly as Britain's interest in Yugoslavia was limited.
Id.
36. See VERNEr & GONIN, supra note 8. at 35 (describing Chancellor Kohl's
decision to capitulate to German public pressure and recognize Croatia although he
acknowledged that it would not solve anything).
37. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 4, in 31
I.L.M. 1501 (1992).
38. Id. at 1503.
39. Id.
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all the citizens of the SRBH without distinction, carried out under inter-
national supervision."'
The limited explicit basis for the Arbitration Commission's short
advisory opinion requires considerable efforts in order to understand the
reasoning. One element that seems certain, however, is that the Arbitra-
tion Commission rightly focused on the fact that the Presidency was not
representing the interests of all three constituent nations of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Consequently, it had to refuse the request and thereby
recognize that President Izetbegovic had exceeded his constitutional
powers by seeking independence without the approval of the Serbs. The
only way the Arbitration Commission could change its opinion would be
if the Serb nation somehow indicated that it was favorable to indepen-
dence: a referendum with Serb participation would manifest this, and
implicit in the reasoning is the requirement for the Serbs to vote in
favor of independence given the constitutional guarantee of equality
between all three nations. Any other interpretation would ignore Bosnia-
Herzegovina's consensus principle and would allow a majority to deter-
mine the fate of a protected minority.41
The Muslim and Croat parliament members decided to proceed with a
referendum on independence even though the Serbs vowed to boycott
it.42 The Muslim nationalist party campaigned for a unitary, democratic
and independent Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the Croat nationalist party
backed the project of separation from Yugoslavia, yet remained ambigu-
ous regarding the unity of Bosnia-Herzegovina since the Croats were
interested in establishing closer ties with Croatia.43 The results were
40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. Regrettably, it appears some commentators have not actually read the opinion.
Several authors have described the opinion in a manner suggesting that the Arbitration
Commission was not particularly troubled about the legitimacy of the request for
recognition and that a referendum with a simple majority would suffice for indepen-
dence to be recognized. See James B. Steinberg, International Involvement in the
Yugoslavia Conflict, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERvENTION IN INTER-
NAL CoNFIcrs 41 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 1993) (suggesting that EC criteria had
been met); CRNOBRBJA, supra note 20, at 147 (suggesting a simple majority would
suffice for independence to be recognized).
42. Florence Hartmann, Le Parlement de Bosnie-Herz.govine a dcidi d'organiser
un r~f~rendum sur l'indipendence, LE MONDE, Jan. 28, 1992, at 3.
43. WYNAENDTS, supra note 29, at 153. The group within the Croat nationalist
party which received the backing of the government of Croatia (Mate Boban's group)
created their own state in western Herzegovina several months later. In the meantime,
however, an objective need existed for the Croats to ally with the Muslims in order
to separate from Yugoslavia, which at that point was clearly Serb-controlled. Never-
[VOL. 11:5
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made public on March 1, 1992: those Muslims and Croats who partici-
pated voted overwhelmingly for independence, while the Serbs effective-
ly boycotted the referendum." With the Muslims and the Croats explic-
itly violating the principle of consensus by holding a referendum without
Serb participation (and in which a total of 37% of the population did
not participate), the referendum failed to fulfill the Arbitration
Commission's requirement that all the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina be
consulted. Even if one of the constituent nations chose not to participate,
the constitutional arrangement prohibited the other two nations from
carrying out constitutional changes affecting the recalcitrant nation.
According to its policy on Bosnia-Herzegovina, the EC was prepared
to recognize independence if the three constituent nations could achieve
an agreement.4' The EC therefore organized negotiations among the
three sides so that Bosnia-Herzegovina could become a political union
divided into three ethnic regions. It had been clear for many months that
no agreement among the three nationalist parties could occur legally and
legitimately that did not involve a substantial transfer of power from the
centralized government to the representatives of the three constituent
nations.
Moreover, none of the parties would accept any form of domination
by another party.' The Muslims and the Croats feared the aggressive
theless, this did not prevent the Croats from organizing their own military units which
were not under the Muslim president's command. The more moderate group of the
Croat nationalist party (Stjepan KIjuic's group) which favoured the unity of Bosnia-
Herzegovina was removed from the party's leadership several weeks before the ref-
erendum.
44. Tim Judah & James Bone, Sarajevo Erupts After Vote for Independence,
LONDON TIMES, Mar. 3, 1992, at 1.
45. VERNET & GONIN, supra note 8, at 95.
46. See Tihomar Loza, Separation Anxiety, in YUGOFAX, BREAKDON: WAR &
RECONSTRUCTION IN YuGoLSLAvIA 29 (1992) (asserting that despite the efforts of
progressive individuals who wanted to maintain a multinational Bosnia-Herzegovina,
the nationalist tensions cannot be ignored along with the fact that no significant
pluralist political force emerged).
This mutual distrust naturally helps the chauvinist forces stay in power. But
even a unified opposition would be at a disadvantage against the three national
parties, with their fantastic amounts of arms and money, network of clerical
support, and likely backing from abroad. The established parties can pretty well
smash all anti-nationalist movements. This was proved during the tense days of
the barricades following the independence referendum. What the Serbian Demo-
cratic Party (SDS) accomplished on its own in Sarajevo on March 2 and
achieved with the help of the Muslim Party for Democratic Action (SDA) on
March 3 proves that the war .. . can be started whenever the leaders deem it
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Serb nationalism promoted by Serbia's President Milosevic who believed
the Yugoslav federation no longer served Serb interests; the Muslims
and the Serbs also feared the Croat nationalist party which was under
the influence of Croatia's President Tudjman who presented himself as a
democrat in the West while adopting reactionnary positions in order to
achieve his separatist dream; the Serbs and the Croats equally feared the
ambiguous Muslim nationalist party which combined nationalism with
radical Islamic tendencies.47 Whereas the Serbs unleashed a furious pro-
paganda campaign designed to eliminate the dangerous cosmopolitanism
(especially in Sarajevo and the major towns) which they considered
undesirable in the national territories emerging from the former Yugosla-
via,' the Muslim-controlled Presidency presented itself as having
pluralist intentions and favoring multinational coexistence. Of course, the
true intentions of the Muslim leadership could be suspect given that the
more numerous Muslims had everything to gain from maintaining a uni-
tary Republic in which they could exert the most influence.49 One
necessary.
Id.
47. For an example of the Muslim nationalist party's religious component, see
President Izetbegovic's Islamska Deklaracija [Islamic Declaration], published in
Sarajevo by the Mala Muslimanska Biblioteka in 1990. This politicized Islamic text
written in 1970 and widely distributed during the 1990 elections, includes the follow-
ing phrases: "Our goal: Islamization of Muslims .... "; "There can be no peace or
coexistence between Islamic faith and non-Islamic institutions .... "The Islamic
movement must and can take power as soon as it is morally and numerically strong
enough, not only to destroy the non-Islamic power, but to build up a new Islamic
one." (Author's own translation).
For an attempt at presenting Izetbegovic's Islamic Declaration in a most favor-
able light that ignores the context of the rising Islamic activism in the Arab world
during the 1960s and 1970s, see Ivo Banac, Bosnian Muslims: From Religious Com-
munity to Socialist Nationhood and Postcommunist Statehood, 1918-1992, in THE
MUSLIMS OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 147-148 (Mark Pinson ed., 1993). Izetbegovic's
lifelong Islamic activism has resulted in his imprisonment on two separate occasions:
first in 1946 for the creation of the journal Mudzahid and then in 1983 following the
well-known "Sarajevo Trial" which represented the culmination of an abusive crack-
down on certain Muslim nationalist excesses. See, e.g., VERNET & GONIN, supra note
8, at 180; GARDE, supra note 3, at 293; PovIc, supra note 6, at 35-40, 66.
48. See FOR SARAJEvO 65 (Ammiel Alcalay ed., 1993) (describing posters warn-
ing against the ever present threat of Islamic daggers and phrases such as:
"Podijelimo se Rto je prije moguce!" [Separate yourselves as soon as possible!]).
49. Although the following passage regards the historical dominance of Serbs in




should not forget that the Muslims were the first to form a party along
nationalist lines in 199050 and had established ties with the Islamic
world that were bound to appear threatening to the Christian Serbs and
Croats, given the history of various civilizations clashing in the Bal-
kans
5 1
So it is not surprising that the EC held negotiations among the three
constituent nations in order to divide the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina
in a manner that would be acceptable to the nationalist leaders. Indeed,
all three sides finally reached such an agreement in Lisbon on February
23, 1992 when they signed a document dividing Bosnia-Herzegovina
into three national regions (the cantonization of the Republic).'
B. PREVENTivE RECOGNrION
It is a grave mistake to believe that the actors at this stage were only
former Yugoslavs. The emerging conflict had captured the attention of
various interests around the world. Of particular importance is the soli-
darity that countries with strong Islamic populations expressed toward
Bosnia-Herzegovina. 3 Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia have all figured
IThe ruling elite indulges in overbearing violations of national equality in favor
of one - usually the most numerous - constituent nationality (hegemonism),
promotes supranational ideologies (often ersatz nationalism), or suggests, at least,
the benefits of union, sometimes implying that the national criteria are an infe-
rior means of political organization. BANAC, supra note 4, at 30.
50. GLENNY, supra note 6, at 149 ("Alija Izetbegovic and the Moslem leadership
also bear a historical responsibility for the breakdown of the consensus between the
three Bosnian communities, for they were the first to organize a political party, the
SDA, along nationalist lines on 26 May 1990.").
51. See JACQUES MERLUNO, Las vERITs YOUGOSLAvEs NE soNr PAS TOtTrEs
BONNES A DIRE 151 (1993) (relaying that following his trip to Tehran in 1991, Presi-
dent Izetbegovic attended the Istanbul meeting of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference in August 1991 and that by November 1991, the Turkish government was
proposing to form and train an army in Bosnia-Herzegovina that would be loyal to
President Izetbegovic); VERNET & GONN, supra note 8, at 101 (recounting a chance
encounter between French diplomats and Izetbegovic in Iran during the spring of
1991).
52. See Derens, supra note 26 (reporting the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into
three national regions in an effort to reach an agreement among nationalist leaders).
Although the details and viability of this option remain unclear, it is important to
retain that agreement among the three parties is central to any solution.
53. See ttienne Copeaux & Stphane Yerasimos, Le Bosnie vue du Bosphore,
HiRODOTE no. 67, 1992, at 151-159 (examining the shift in regional powers due to
the collapse of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, particularly with regard to
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prominently in President Izetbegovic's attempt to gain international sym-
pathy for his cause.54 Yet it is the United States that most directly
managed to influence the outcome of the EC's negotiation efforts in an
attempt to improve and fortify its relations in the Islamic world. Con-
trary to popular belief, the United States did play a pivotal role before
the outbreak of hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.56 In fact, the United
States Ambassador to Yugoslavia at the time has since suggested in an
interview that he encouraged President Izetbegovic to publicly renounce
increased Islamic presence).
54. Paul-Marie de ]a Gorce, Les risques d'extension du conflit en Bosnie, LE
MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Jan. 1993, at 9. See Paul-Marie de la Gorce, La crise
yougoslave prise en main par Washington, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Apr. 1994, at
11 (noting the Islamic world's interest in the Bosnian conflict).
55.
As [President] Turgut Ozal said during a trip to Washington in May 1992, the
fluid situation in the Balkans has presented Turkey with "a once-in-a-lifetime"
opportunity for Turkey to restore its economic, diplomatic and cultural influence
among Moslem vestiges of the Ottoman empire' . . . While showing the appro-
priate diplomatic interest in countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and
Romania, Washington has developed its relations with Sofia, Tirana and (tacitly)
with Skopje with an unparalleled zeal since the collapse of communism in the
three republics. The central focus of US policy is Turkey, which Washington
recognizes as a major regional power with considerable potential for expansion.
GLENNY, supra note 6, at 240-41. The extraordinary developments in Albania
since the fall of communism should be kept in mind since they contribute to
Balkan tensions and reflect the recent geo-political developments in the region.
From a strictly secular and anti-capitalist isolated totalitarian state, Albania now
has strong ties with the US-including a reorganized Army assisted by the
Pentagon-and is a member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. See
Second Phase of Army Restructure Completed, BALKAN NEWS, Oct. 24, 1993,
at 5 (discussing the potential significance for democracy and Albanian indepen-
dence in light of Abania's efforts to restructure its army); Albania Should Prob-
ably Rethink its Position, BALKAN NEws, Nov. 7, 1993, at 4 (outlining
Albania's new ties with the US).
56. See David Gompert, How to Defeat Serbia, 73 FOREIGN AFF., July/Aug.
1994, at 32 (providing a commentary by the former Senior Director for Europe and
Eurasia on the Bush administration's National Security Council Staff in which the
suggestion that the US was not interested or lacked solid information on the situation
in Bosnia-Herzegovina is dismissed as simply not true).
Contrary to a widely held view, the Bush administration was well aware of the
dangers in Yugoslavia prior to the crisis. It simply knew of no way to prevent
a violent disintegration. National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Deputy
Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, among others, understood Yugoslavia
and its volcanic nature.
Id. at 32.
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the Lisbon (territorial partition/cantonization) agreement soon after hav-
ing signed it.' This occurred because the United States government
had decided that it would support President Izetbegovic's drive for inde-
pendence even without the existence of an agreement among the three
constituent nations." Consequently, after returning to Sarajevo, the em-
boldened President Izetbegovic appeased his own party's hard-liners by
announcing that the Lisbon partition maps were unacceptable and indi-
cated his intention to pursue full independence despite objections from
the Serbs. 9
57. David Binder, U.S. Policymakers on Bosnia Admit Errors in Opposing Parti-
tion in 1992, N.Y. Tiars, Aug. 29, 1993, at 10.
Immediately after Mr. Izetbegovic returned from Lisbon, [Ambassador] Zimmer-
mann called on him in Sarajevo. The Bosnian leader complained bitterly that
the European Community and Bosnian Serbs and Croats had pressured him to
accept partition. 'He didn't like it,' Mr. Zimmermann recalled. 'I told him, if
he didn't like it, why sign it?' In retrospect, Mr. Zimmermann said in a recent
interview, 'the Lisbon agreement wasn't bad at all.' But after talking to the
Ambassador, Mr. Izetbegovic publicly renounced the Lisbon agreement.
Ambassador Zimmermann has claimed in a letter published in the N.Y. Times
that he was misinterpreted. Letter from Ambassador Zimmerman, N.Y. TlMMs,
Sept. 30, 1993, at A24.
58. Binder, supra note 57, at 10.
The Bush Administration pushed ahead with its plan for recognition. 'The poli-
cy was to encourage Izetbegovic to break with the partition plan," said a high-
ranking State Department official who asked not to be identified. "It was not
committed to paper. We let it be known we would support his Government in
the United Nations if they got into trouble. But there were no guarantees, be-
cause [Secretary of State] Baker didn't believe it would happen."
Id.
59. GLENWY, supra note 6, at 166-167; VERNEr & GONIN, supra note 8, at 96;
CRNOBRNJA, supra note 20, at 177-178. See Bougarel, supra note 4, at 145 (diagram-
ming the Muslim nationalist party's cantonization proposal). In a similar manner,
further negotiations and one more agreement reached in the following weeks ultimate-
ly collapsed. These were not the first occasions in which President Izetbegovic had
backed down from agreements concerning future constitutional arrangements for
Bosnia-Herzegovina. In fact, he has acknowledged in a conversation with Adil
Zulfikarpasic (who was the co-founder along with Izetbegovic of the first Muslim
nationalist party in 1990 but later left the party in order to become leader of the
opposition Muslim Bosnian Organization) his reputation for untrustworthiness among
the Serbs that resulted from his repudiation of a well-known statement he made in
1991 showing support for transforming Yugoslavia into a confederation in order to
avoid conflict among the consitutent Republics. What is less well-known outside
Bosnia-Herzegovina is that Muslim nationalists denounced him as a "sell-out" and a
"Serb" following this statement. Consequently, he quickly renounced his support for a
confederation and embarked on an independence trajectory increasingly influenced by
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United States intervention raised tensions in an already explosive
situation and complicated the EC's preventive diplomatic efforts. On
March 13, 1992, the United Nations (UN) military force sent to the
former Yugoslavia set up its headquarters in Sarajevo.' Although the
United Nations Protection Force's (UNPROFOR) mandate concerned
only Croatia,6 the UN Secretary General ordered it to establish its
headquarters in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the hope that such a presence
would help to calm the situation.6' The three hundred UN personnel
who arrived were well short of the large preventive UN peacekeeping
force secretly requested by President Izetbegovic.63
Fighting broke out in various parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina one week
later as it became clear that President Izetbegovic was not going to
respect the principle of consensus in his drive for independence.' Re-
ports indicate Serb paramilitary forces began almost immediately to
the clerical and anti-Serb elements of his party. By refusing to sign a historic agree-
ment ["Istorijskog sporazuma"] negotiated between Zulfikarpasic and the leaders of the
Serb nationalist party in July 1991, President Izetbegovic undermined any real chance
for the continuation of multinational coexistence in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The local
population approved of this agreement which had the crucial approval of Serbia's
President Milosevic and had temporarily calmed Serb insecurities and paranoid fears
of subjugation. Nonetheless, President Izetbegovic refused to sign the historic agree-
ment even though he had admitted that Zulfikarpasic was negotiating on his behalf.
See MILovAN Dm.As, BOSNJAK ADIL ZULFIKARPASIC 203-230 (1995) (relating an in-
terview between Milovan Djilas and Adil Zulfikarpasic on the situation in Bosnia-
Herzogovina).
60. LEwis MACKENZIE, PEACEKEEPER - THE ROAD To SARAJEvO 118 (1993).
61. U.N. SCOR, 3,049th mtg., Annex U.N. Doc. S/23280 (1991) reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 1427, 1442. UNPROFOR's military command advised against the establishment
of the headquarters in Sarajevo since it would be located too far from the troops in
Croatia.
62. Lewis Mackenzie, World Focus on Bosnia: Tragic Errors, MACLEAN'S, Dec.
12, 1994, at 35.
63. Id.
64. GLENNY, supra note 6, at 167. The Serbs were not the only ones who re-
sorted to aggressive and bellicose statements. Prior to the armed conflict, one of the
most influential members of the Muslim nationalist party, Omer Behmen, did not hide
that his party was arming the Muslim inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina and spoke
admiringly of two Muslim paramilitary organizations: the Green Berets and the Patri-
otic League. MILOVAN DJILAs, BOS&JAK ADIL ZULFISKARPASIC 203-30 (1995), reprint-
ed in DIALOGUE, 1995, at 53. Another popular member of the Muslim nationalist
party with strong ties in the Arab world is Foreign Affairs Minister Haris Silajdzic
(who later became Prime Minister after the war started), who warned that if the Yu-
goslav People's Army did not leave Bosnia-Herzegovina following the independence
referendum, it would be thrown out. VERNEr & GONIN, supra note 8, at 181.
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engage in a campaign of ruthless ethnic cleansing on territories coveted
by the Serb leadership.' Acting as President Izetbegovic's new ally,
the United States government' convinced the EC states to recognize
the Republic on April 6, 1992, by agreeing to recognize Croatia and
Slovenia along with Bosnia-Herzegovina the following day.67 Those
involved used the expression "preventive recognition" in order to justify
this admittedly dangerous gamble given that the Serbs had often repeat-
ed their intention to resort to the use of force should recognition pre-
cede a political agreement.'
Thus, the international community proceeded to recognize the inde-
pendence of a state that had ceased to exist in any meaningful way.?
The constitutional crisis left a parliament that no longer represented the
three constituent nations and a government that no longer functioned
legally.7 Furthermore, a majority of putative citizens denied the author-
65. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT ON BOSNtA-HERZEGOViNA: GROSS ABUSES
OF BASIc HUMAN RIGHTS 7 (Oct. 1992).
66. VERNET & GONIN, supra note 8, at 96-97.
67. Binder, supra note 57, at 10; John Palmer, US Forces Early Move on
Bosnia, GUARDiAN, Mar. 10, 1992, at 8. There are, of course, many simple and un-
convincing explanations as to why the US was so interested in having Bosnia-
Herzegovina recognized, especially after having encouraged the EC to assume lead-
ership in the Yugoslav crisis and having opposed Croatian recognition.
When a two-thirds majority of Bosnians - made up of Muslims and Croats,
with Bosnia's Serbs boycotting - voted for independence, the United States
pressured the EC to recognize Bosnia in exchange for United States recognition
of Slovenia and Croatia. Recognition of Bosnia did not precipitate the use of
force by the Bosnian Serbs any more than it deterred it. Very simply, Bosnian
Muslims would not stay in a Yugoslavia dominated by Serbia, and Bosnian
Serbs would not stay in a Bosnia dominated by Muslims. In any case, there
was no legal basis for the United States to recognize Croatia but not Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
Gompert, supra note 56, at 36-37. See Steinberg, supra note 41, at 41-42 (pro-
viding a naive explanation for the US position).
68. CRNOBRNJA, supra note 20, at 211.
69. Muhamed Filipovic, Conditions et circonstances du maintien de la paix en
Bosnie-Herzigovine, in LA FRAGNIENTATION DE LA YOUGOSLAVIE 43 (Catherine
Samary ed., 1992) (providing a description written by one of the leaders of the main
Muslim opposition party (Muslim Bosnian Organization) just before the outbreak of
hostilities in which the chaos regarding the control of governmental institutions is
described).
70. GLENNY, supra note 6, at 177.
None of these people [members of the Presidency] had a constitutional
mandate - parliament had been dissolved illegally before it had agreed to grant
the Presidency emergency powers. The government still existed but . . . the
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ity of the Muslim-controlled Presidency, while violent militia units from
the various constituent nations were seizing the territory.7
International law generally recognizes that the elements which consti-
tute a state include the existence of a defined population, a distinct
territory and an effective government.' The case of Bosnia-
Herzegovina represents a striking example of disregard for established
legal principles since the international community recognized an inde-
pendent state where an illegitimate government73 never controlled a
significant part of the population or territory which it claimed.74 Legal
commentators have failed to comment on the fact that the UN later
admitted this state as a member, even though the state was never in a
position to assume the obligations contained in the UN Charter.75 This
example of premature recognition does, nevertheless, confirm the impor-
tance and relevance of the present criteria regarding statehood and inter-
national recognition.
In the context of the brutal disintegration of the former Yugoslavia,
the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina's independence without respect
cabinet wielded no authority. Its members were window-dressing, fashioned to
give the impression of legality where none existed.
Id.
71. Jean-Franqois Kahn, Bosnie: L'histoire d'une manipulation, L'-VBNEMENT DU
JEUDI, Aug. 24-30, 1995, at 11.
72. JOHN DUGARD, RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED NAnTONS 7 (1987).
73. Although one should note that international law does not require that a gov-
ernment hold power in conformity with internal constitutional provisions. The applica-
ble principle is non-interference in the internal matters of a state.
74.
Criteria for recognizing a state include whether it has effective control over a
defined territory and population, an organized governmental administration and
the capacity to act effectively to conduct foreign relations and to fulfill interna-
tional obligations . . . International law does not require recognition of a state,
even when these conditions are met.
THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & HAROLD G. MAIER, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
A NUTSHELL § 8-4 (2d ed. 1990).
75. "Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states
which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of
the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations." U.N. CHARTER
art. 4 (emphasis added). Despite these clear requirements, the UN Security Council
recommended to the General Assembly that the UN admit Bosnia-Herzegovina as a
member. S.C. Res. 755, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3079th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/755
(1992). The General Assembly admitted Bosnia-Herzegovina as a UN member state on
May 22, 1992 by its Resolution 237(XLVI). G.A. Res. 237, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess.,
Supp. No. 49A, U.N. Doc. 46/237 (1992).
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for international legal principles (and internal constitutional guarantees)
only encouraged the various parties to seek their goals by the use of
force.76 The victims of these ruthless military solutions would be the
inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina who found themselves in the "wrong"
national territory (1.4 million people or 1/3 of the total population)'
and who would become the objects of forced population shifts." Far
from preventing an explosive situation, self-interested members of the
international community aggravated a situation that any informed observ-
er should have known would assure that these population shifts would
be of the most violent kind:
By denying that partition of Bosnia could take place when in fact it was
inevitable, the international community ensured that it would be accom-
plished in the worst possible way. The map of Bosnia was redrawn in
blood on the ground, rather than around a table.'
III. UPROOTED SECURITY FOR BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
It is important to understand that the deep tensions resulting from the
constitutional crisis made coexistence and the survival of a multinational
territory virtually impossible:'
76. It is unfortunate that it has taken some influential newspapers several years
before they started publishing articles acknowledging the controversial conditions under
which the international community recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina's independence:
On such treacherous ground, prudence is a virtue. The consent of all three
Bosnian nations was clearly a precondition for independence without war. But
distracted by other matters then viewed as more pressing, the United States and
Europe tried to will Bosnia into being as an independent state without the
consent of its Serbs.
Roger Cohen, Bosnia - Where Facts Strangle Principles, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14,
1994, at E3.
77. Michel Roux, A propos de la purification ethnique en Bosnie-Herzigovine,
H.]ODrrE, no. 67, at 58 (1992).
78. The observations of the former special envoy of the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees in the former Yugoslavia shed some perspective on this situation. "In
Bosnia, as early as April 1992, it became obvious to UNHCR that one of the basic
characteristics of the conflict was that civilian displacement was not a consequence,
but an objective of the war (a finding that we reported early on)." Josd-Maria
Mendiluce, War and Disaster in the Former Yugoslavia: The Limits of Humanitarian
Action, in U.S. COMMITE FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 1994, at 13.
79. Robert M. Hayden, U.S. Efforts to Resolve Balkan Crisis Have Only Added
to Muslims' Losses, SUN-SENTNEL, Feb. 9, 1994, at 19.
80. Kahn, supra note 71, at 11-12. This became evident after the nationalist and
chauvinist actors brushed aside the only progressive political forces in Bosnia-
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Moreover, it is difficult to imagine a long-term settlement of the current
conflict in what used to be Yugoslavia that will not involve some major,
permanent, shift of populations ... . What is noteworthy about each of
these [possible outcomes to the war] is that they would all involve some
blend of the movement of borders and people with the ultimate result
being that the remaining entities would more approximate a one state/one
nation norm - or in Bosnia, a one canton/one nation norm - than did their
predecessor republics in communist Yugoslavia.
Such a movement of borders and people would be scarcely the first time
governments in the Balkans or elsewhere opted to solve the security prob-
lems posed by the inter-ethnic rivalries of a larger multi-national entity by
attempting to better approximate a one nation/one state model . . . . In all
three of these scenarios, Croatia, Serbia including the Vojvodina, and
parts of Bosnia would all emerge from the civil war more nearly ethnical-
ly homogeneous than each has been in the past. Unfortunately, the tran-
sition implied by any of these outcomes will involve huge human
costs."'
The attempt to maintain the unity of Bosnia-Herzegovina was terribly
unrealistic and inappropriate.82 In other words, this was not the time to
experiment with notions of multiethnicity and multinationalism.83 While
Herzegovina.
81. William Zimmerman, Migration and Security in Yugoslavia, in INTERNATION-
AL MIGRATION AND SECURITY 79-80 (Myron Weiner ed., 1993).
82.
That's why borders, and the movements of individuals and groups across bor-
ders, are bitterly disputed as soon as imperial rule recedes and nations begin
the process of "liberation." And, once again, to reverse this process or to re-
press its effects would require massive coercion on a global scale. There is no
easy way to avoid the country (and the proliferation of countries) as we cur-
rently know it. Hence the theory of justice must allow for the territorial state,
specifying the rights of its inhabitants and recognizing the collective right of
admission and refusal.
MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 44 (1983).
83.
Globalism in a post-imperial age only permits a post-nationalist consciousness
for those cosmopolitans who are lucky enough to live in the wealthy West .
• . . It is only too apparent that cosmopolitanism is the privilege of those who
can take a secure nation state for granted . . . . At the very least, cosmopoli-
tan disdain and astonishment at the ferocity with which people will fight to win
a nation state of their own is displaced. They are, after all, only fighting for a
privilege cosmopolitans have long taken for granted.
MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, BLOOD & BELONGING: JOURNEYS INTO THE NEW NATION-
ALISM 9 (1993).
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it is unlikely that an early partitioning of Bosnia-Herzegovina before the
outbreak of hostilities would have completely avoided the displacement
of civilian populations, an early partitioning may have limited the hu-
man costs by creating an atmosphere in which population shifts could
occur in a more orderly and secure manner and in which displacement
would not be intimately tied to military objectives.
Population shifts during an ongoing civil war inevitably result in
terrible human suffering. As soon as the armed conflict in Bosnia-
Herzegovina began, it should not be surprising that only an individual's
national group offered security and protection from violence. Thus, the
"logic" of ethnic cleansing took over as people no longer trusted their
neighbors and sought to live uniquely among their own ethnic national
group:
Never say ethnic cleansing is just racial hatred run wild, just Balkan
madness. For there is a deep logic to it. By 1990, this part of Yugoslavia
was a Hobbesian world. No one in these villages could be sure who
would protect them. If they were Serbs and someone attacked them and
they went to the Croatian police, would the Croats protect them? If they
were Croats, in a Serbian village, could they be protected against a night-
time attack from a Serbian paramilitary team, usually led by a former
policeman? This is how ethnic cleansing began to acquire its logic. If you
can't trust your neighbours, drive them out. If you can't live among them,
live only among your own. This alone appeared to offer people security.
This only gave respite from the fear which leaped like a brush-fire from
house to house."
Although valuing ethnicity in this context does not amount to valuing
ethnic cleansing, one cannot ignore that the separation of warring nation-
alities that have previously coexisted together in the same territory is
perhaps the only form of trustworthy security:
84. Id. at 26. The following account, given by a BBC Correspondent, is also
useful in understanding how ethnic cleansing tragically became the norm:
I took a short walk with a local Serb policeman to discuss the situation with
him. He confirmed the countless observations which I had made when talking
to local fighters of all nationalities - he was not a man of evil. On the con-
trary, he explained how he found it very difficult to shoot at the other side of
his village, because he knew everybody who lived there. But the war had
somehow arrived and he had to defend his home. The man was confused and
upset by the events but he now perceived the Green Berets and the Ustashas to
be a real threat to his family.
GLENNY, supra note 6, at 173-74.
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Nobody in the West wants to appear to be condoning ethnic cleansing,
but every day, every hour, civilians are fleeing war zones, or being driven
hence by men with guns, into the relative safety of their own ethnic
enclaves. Ethnic apartheid may be an abomination, but for the more than
two million refugees who have fled or been driven from their homes,
apartheid is the only guarantee of safety they are prepared to trust."
Prevention of the outbreak of hostilities could have avoided the situa-
tion in which the belligerents perceived ethnic cleansing as "logical."
Yet, in this regard one must concede that considerable international
efforts at preventive diplomacy existed and that these efforts did in fact
address the central issue of the dispute. Nevertheless, influential mem-
bers of the international community decided to promote their own inter-
ests even though these interests were contrary to the preventive diplo-
matic efforts that were showing some signs of success. Furthermore,
when the predictable refugee flows began crossing international borders,
these same states concentrated on developing mechanisms that would
help avoid legal obligations toward involuntary migrants, while insisting
that their contribution to refugee protection would focus on concepts
such as "preventive protection." On a more cynical level, the case of
Bosnia-Herzegovina suggests that powerful and affluent states in the UN
are not firmly committed to preventive diplomatic activity, despite all
the rhetoric of the early 1990s.86
When Serb nationalists challenged secessionist aspirations in Croatia
and Slovenia during 1991 by claiming to be defending a multinational
Yugoslav federation, the international community saw through the Serb
propaganda and denounced the transparent Serb hegemonic intentions.
When Muslim nationalists in Bosnia-Herzegovina suddenly began to
promote a newly independent multinational state, the international com-
munity naively accepted this rhetoric while the Muslim leaders pursued
their own hegemonic interests. It is striking how the idea of a multina-
85. IGNATIEFF, supra note 83, at 26. See Aleksa Djilas, Fear Thy Neighbor: The
Breakup of Yugoslavia, in NATIONALISM AND NATIONALITIES IN THE NEw EUROPE 99
(Charles A. Kupchan ed., 1995) (pointing out that since "Bosnia's Parliament, courts,
press, and police had no authority as impartial institutions, affiliation with one's na-
tional group emerged as the only source of protection, whether of one's human rights
or physical security").
86. See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Preventive Diplomacy, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE
13-19 (1992) (documenting diplomatic precautions and actions necessary to avoid
political conflict); Prevention, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES 121-137 (1993)




tional Bosnia-Herzegovina gained the widespread approval of an interna-
tional community that readily accepted the dissolution of the multina-
tional former Yugoslavia.
The numerous commentators and observers who insist on the preser-
vation of Bosnia-Herzegovina's territorial integrity, while invoking inter-
national principles, do not understand that the recognition of this state
had nothing to do with respect for international law. Even after three
years of fighting between the three consitutent nations, the international
news media continues to portray the Muslim-controlled government in
Sarajevo as a legitimate representative of a Bosnia-Herzegovina that is
genuinely committed to multinational coexistence.'
The myth of an existing and genuine multinational government based
in Sarajevo has only served to obscure the real political actors in this
conflict.s It is time to recognize that the international community inap-
87. Some observers who had initially believed in the sincerity of President
Izetbegovic's commitment to multinationalism changed their opinion soon after the
outbreak of hostilities: "Let's not kid ourselves either about the nature of the [Mus-
lim-controlled] Bosnian government . . . . It is only to the outside world that the
Bosnian government maintains the fiction of its 'multiethnic' character, for the obvi-
ous reason that a multiethnic state is more likely to get international aid." George
Kenney, A Forced Peace Is Worth Trying, L.A. TiMEs, Feb. 6, 1994, at M5. See
Rdny Ourdan, La fin du rive bosniaque - Les dirigeants musulmans donnent le coup
de grdce i l'espoir d'un 6tat multiethnique, LE MONDE, Sept. 28, 1994, at 1 (dis-
cussing the implementation of Islamic rules in government-controlled areas). Surpris-
ingly, some observers continued after several years to believe the pluralist declarations
of Bosnia-Herzegovina's Muslim-controlled government. Unfortunately, the international
news media rarely questioned the statements made by frequently interviewed represen-
tatives such as the Foreign Affairs Minister Muhamed Sacirbey who claimed to be
protecting an ideal of multinational tolerance. The fact that Sacirbey, an American
citizen, is the son of an Islamic activist (Nezid Sacirbegovic, recently appointed as an
Ambassador for Bosnia-Herzegovina) who left Yugoslavia after being convicted togeth-
er with Izetbegovic in 1946, makes him an unconvincing spokesman for genuine
multinational coexistence in Bosnia-Herzegovina. See also VERNET & GONIN, supra
note 8, at 181 (describing Sacirbey's problematic background). Surely, Sacirbey's
support for the Parliament's vote to assure that only a Muslim (and member of
Izetbegovic's party) can become President as long as a state of war exists indicates
an agenda carefully hidden from the outside world:
But earlier this month the Parliament, which is controlled by the governing
party, changed the Constitution, taking over from the Executive Council the
power to replace members of the presidency who are unable to continue in
their posts. Parliament also determined that while the war lasts, the council
president, currently Mr. Izetbegovic, must be a Muslim and a party member.
Mike O'Conner, Split Divides President and Premier In Bosnia, N.Y. TINs,
Aug. 16, 1995, at A8.
88. The myth of a genuinely multinational political force in Bosnia-Herzegovina
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propriately involved itself in a dirty civil war that, not surprisingly,
included atrocities and political manipulation.89 Positive contributions to
ending the armed conflict must acknowledge that while a multinational
state with Croats, Serbs and Muslims living harmoniously together
would have been an inspirational example of coexistence, the reality is
that these warring nations have to be separated." The tragic conse-
has received considerable academic support. John V.A. Fine, The Medieval And Otto-
man Roots of Modern Bosnian Society, in THE MUSLIMS OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 2,
21 (Mark Pinson ed., 1993).
One third of the Territorial Defense Forces of Sarajevo, including its second in
command, is Serb. Thus Serbs (and Croats too) are on both sides. And both
Croats and Serb chauvinists want to depict the conflict as an ethnic war - to
justify their states' territorial expansion, to demean the Bosnian cause by mak-
ing it seem as if it too were just one more narrow ethnic one, and also to
label it ethnic Muslim to stir fears of the Turkish past and of Muslim funda-
mentalism . . . the Bosnian cause is not simply a Muslim cause but a cause
that includes all three nationalities, and it includes Bosnia's Serbs and Croats
along with Muslims. Yugoslavs of all ethnic groups should see that the true
interest of their respective nationalities is represented by the Bosnian cause, that
rises above the divisive chauvinism. The cause of Serbs and Croats is not rep-
resented by the ethnic militias running around Bosnia and Herzegovina claiming
to speak for their respective peoples. The true Serbian cause is that of the
Bosnians.
Id. (emphasis added). While the suggestion that chauvinist Serbs and Croats
have tried to manipulate public opinion against the Muslims is correct, a de-
tailed examination of the nationalist tensions should make it clear that very few
non-Muslims would willingly participate in the armed forces under President
Izetbegovic's command). Indeed, observers believe that the recognized
government's army included 13% Serbs at the beginning of the conflict and
that this number dropped to around 3-6% after several months of fighting (this
percentage includes Serb males used for forced labor). COHEN, supra note 4, at
322.
89.
So the West and Bosnian Muslims would have to admit they were wrong to
try to force their new Bosnia down the throats of Bosnian Serb Christians. If
admitting errors to gain peace damages the "credibility" of Western diplomats
and politicians, that seems a bearable price for ending a war that should never
have started.
A.M. Rosenthal, Bombs for Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1995, at A25.
90.
Of course it would be preferable to have a pluralistic, multi-ethnic Bosnian
society and state, where everyone lives together. But the parties had that once.
It was called Yugoslavia, and the Serbs, Muslims and Croats all helped to rip
that state apart. That is why the only way to stabilize things now is to divide
Bosnia among them . . . . Neither the [US] Administration nor the Congress
CONSEQUENCES OF INTERVENTION
quences of the international community's diplomatic intervention have
only worsened the fate of the violently uprooted inhabitants of Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
wants to recognize what the Europeans already have - that the ideal multi-eth-
nic, democratic Bosnia, if it were ever possible, cannot be achieved now. The
only way to achieve it would be to force the Serbs, Muslims and Croats to
live together under one roof, which they demonstrably do not want to do. None
of the parties right now are fighting to live together. They are each fighting for
ethnic survival or independence. We can lament the idea of a multi-ethnic.
pluralistic Bosnia but we cannot build it from the raw material at hand.
The only sane thing left is to stop the killing and build the least bad
peace around the Bosnia we have, which is one in which Serbs, Croats and
Muslims live apart until they can learn again to live together.
Thomas L. Friedman, Fire, Ready, Aim, N.Y. TiMEs, July 30, 1995, at 15.
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